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The paper present the results of the survey that was designed to examine 
attitudes towards reconciliation, traumatic experience, as well as some basic 
values, attitudes and stereotypes in two cities of the former Yugoslavia where 
the nationalities that were in conflict live together. The survey was conducted 
on 400 subjects in Vukovar (inhabited by Serbs and Croats) and 400 subjects 
in Prijedor (Serbs and Bosniaks). The results show that the level of traumatic 
experience,  as  a  single  variable,  has  no  correlation  with  the  readiness  for 
reconciliation. On the other hand, in General Linear Model, best predictors of 
the readiness for reconciliation were attitudes and values represented by the 
factors “Non-Ethnocentric” and Non-Nationalistic/ Xenophobic”. Also, having 
friends  among  the  “opposing”  nationality  and  having  positive  experiences 
with the members of opposing national groups is highly related to a readiness 
for  reconciliation.  Finally,  a  belief  in  war  crime  trials,  combined  with  a 
readiness to admit the war crimes among its own nationality, was a significant 
predictor of readiness for reconciliation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Nation is a society that shares 
common illusions about its ancestors 
and common hatred toward its neighbors. 
Ernest Renan, French philosopher 
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Factors which contribute to or hinder the reconciliation process 
   
 
Yugoslav wars of 1991-1995 between Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks will remain 
noted in history by their cruelty, ethnic cleansing and war crimes. Is reconciliation 
possible? What are the chances and obstacles for that process? 
Before trying to answer those questions, we have to define reconciliation. In 
contemporary literature, there is no empirically validated definition of the process of 
reconciliation (Villa-Vicencio, 2002). According to the research in South Africa, the 
most frequent connotation of the word reconciliation is “forgiveness”, followed by 
“unity” (Lombard, 2003). Etymologically, the word reconciliation (“pomirenje”) in 
the Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian language means reconstitution of peace, but in its 
most common usage, it also means forgiveness and re-cooperation. 
One of the best mesure of the individual level of reconciliation could be the 
trend of multiethnic marriages, or (since those data is usually difficult to obtain) the 
results of the surveys on ethnic distance. It is interest to note that the research of 
ethnic distance in Yugoslavia on the eve of conflict - in 1989 and 1990 (Pantić, 
1991), shows surprising data: in Bosnia and Herzegovina
2 and Croatia, almost no 
ethnic distance among Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks had been registered! Even if there 
is a doubt in the results of the study, considering them a consequence of socially 
(and politically) desirable answers in the era of “Brotherhood and Unity” among 
peoples of Yugoslavia enforced by communist propaganda, there remains the fact 
that, according to 1991 census data, there were more than 30 per cent of mixed 
marriages in the parts of B&H and Croatia where the later conflict was the strongest 
(Petrović,  1985;  Gagnon,  1994)!  How  can  we  talk  about  “centuries  old  hatred” 
looking at those data? Unfortunatelly, after the war eruption, ethnic distance among 
Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks dramatically increased, and by the end of the war it 
began to decrease, slowly, but constantly (Šiber, 1997; Biro et al., 2002). It is still, 
unfortunately,  significantly  higher  than  the  pre-war  one.  To  the  question  from 
Bogardus’  (1925)  Social  Distance  Scale  “Would  you  accept  member  of  .... 
nationality to be your son or daughter in law?”, only 21 per cent of Croats from 
Croatia would accept it with Serbs, and 23 per cent with Bosniaks (Šiber, 1997). 
Bosniaks would accept such “blood” relationship with Serbs in 20.5 per cent and 
with Croats in 25.1 per cent (Puhalo, 2003). This readiness is somewhat higher in 
Serbs in Serbia - 49 per cent would accept familial relationship with Croats, and 36 
per cent with Bosniaks (Biro et al., 2002), but much lower in Serbs in B&H – only 
13.9 per cent would accept such a relationship with Bosniaks and 15.9 per cent with 
Croats (Puhalo, 2003). 
The analysis of the results of research in Serbia (Biro et al., 2000; 2002) shows 
that ethnic distance correlates highly with (low) education level, authoritarianism 
and  age  -  which  is  in  concordance  with  theory  and  earlier  results.  New  and 
unexpected  data  is  that  young  people  exhibit  high  ethnic  distance  towards 
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nationalities with which there had been a conflict. One possible explanation of these 
data is that these young people grew up during war and were educated in the spirit of 
hatred. Another explanation of these results is in line with “Contact hypothesis” 
(Allport, 1954): these adolescents had no chance to meet their peers' - member of 
“enemy” people, so their perception of these nationalities is purely abstract. 
Nevertheless the individual level of reconciliation is the most important one 
and the easiest to measure, there is no doubt that the group influence, the perception 
of other groups and the influence of that perception (so well described in the social 
psychology literature - i.e. Hardin, 1995), are important concepts to understand and 
study the process of reconciliation.  
Following the ecological paradigm (Kelly et al., 2000) and the model of social 
reconstruction offered by Fletcher and Weinstein (2002), we look at reconciliation 
as part of the wider process of social reconstruction.  
 Messages  from  media  and  political  elite  are  of  great  significance  for 
perception (and fear) of “enemy” group and for orientation towards reconciliation.  
Wast number of various data show crucial role of media in “creation” a war 
and hatred in Yugoslav conflict (Biro, 1994; Glenny, 1996; Thomson, 1999). One 
interesting example how media can also influence the process of reconciliation is the 
relation to the war crimes. Right after the fall of Milošević, the main state TV station 
started  broadcasting  a  serial  on  Serbian  crimes  in  Srebrenica,  but  after  “great 
pressure from the public” stopped this broadcast after the first episode. Similarly, 
after the broadcast of popular talk show “Latinica” on Croatian TV, which treated 
the  subject  of  Croatian  war  crimes,  there  were  “so  many  public  reactions”  that 
Croatian  TV  after  a  few  days  broadcast  a  short  film  on  Serbian  war  crimes  in 
Croatia in order to establish “balance” again. At the same time, public opinion polls 
showed that even then, more than 70 per cent of the population (maybe we could 
also say: only 70 per cent) had been aware of existence of war crimes (Biro et al., 
2000). It is obvious that, to have a sense of “public attitudes”, it suffices for minority 
to be louder. But, when this (minority) attitude with the help of media is shown as 
the majority one, then to confronted peoples it sends the message “they all hate us”.  
Similarily, the unpreparedness of Serbain and Croatian authorities to deliver 
their war criminals is a good example of how behavior of the political elite can 
influence the reconciliation process. Justifying this by saying “there is no public 
opinion  support  for  this”,  they  send  their  people  the  message  that  “the  majority 
thinks  there  are  no  criminals  in  our  nationality”  and,  at  the  same  time,  to  the 
nationality  with  whom  the  conflict  existed  they  send  the  message  about 
unpreparedness to apologize for crimes committed - which is one of the fundamental 
preconditions for reconciliation.  
One of the interesting theoretical questions is how significant is the gesture of 
apology of a “head of the state” in the name of his nation for crimes committed by 
individuals  from  those  nation?  Did  Willie  Brandt's  kneeling  down  in  Aushwitz 
contribute to “taking the guilt off” of German people for the crimes of the Second 
World War? For individuals with liberal value determinants, this certainly did not 
mean  anything,  since  even  before  and  after  that  act  they  had  been  able  to Mklos Biro and Petar Milin 
 
differentiate individual from collective and to individualize guilt. But for majority of 
those  others,  who  succumbed  to  national  homogenization,  this  act  has  symbolic 
value and head of the state is perceived as personification of nation, and his apology 
is  undoubtedly  seen  as  apology  of  the  nation  itself.  According  to  our  data,  the 
apology of national leader has such symbolic meaning for the majority of people in 
the former Yugoslavia (Biro et al., 2002).  
In the case of post-Yugoslav states, the level of reconciliation process can also 
be viewed through public performances. Here, the possible conclusions are quite 
contradictory: while at rock concerts we note total neglect of ethnic origins, at sports 
events nationalistic incidents still dominate. The most striking example of “negative 
message” form a public gathering was an incident at the capital of Serb entity in 
B&H (“Republika Srpska”), in Banja Luka. During the ceremony of laying down of 
foundation stone for reconstruction of destroyed mosque “Ferhadija”, there were 
some  rough  nationalistic  incidents.  In  Sarajevo  media,  these  incidents  were 
presented  as  clear  proof  of  the  continuity  of  Serbian  chauvinism  -  and  the 
consequence was temporarily slowing down of the process of return of Bosniaks 
refugees to their homes in the Serb entity. 
Institutional  solutions  and  administrative  acts  can  have  either  helping  or 
hindering role in the reconciliation process in two ways - as objective factors, but 
also as messages that “the state” of one people sends to the members of another 
people. In the case of the former Yugoslavia it is of special importance, since the 
nationalities  that  were  in  conflict  created  “their”  states.  Such  an  example  is  the 
extremely  restrictive  visa  regime  preventing  conctacts  between  citizens  of  the 
former Yugoslavia introduced by several new states. Quite the contrary example is 
B&H. One of the acts of genius of the Office of High Representative for B&H was 
equalization of registration plates for cars
3, by which they put a stop to geographic, 
and, indirectly, ethnic identification
4 and so enabled all inhabitants unhindered travel 
all over B&H. Similar move of disabling identification was made by government in 
Rwanda, which officially forbade checking and declaring one's ethnic background. 
Since the concept of reconciliation is obviously complex, for the purposes of 
this study, we defined reconciliation operationally by three variables:  
1.  Readiness  to  accept  the  presence  of  members  of  the  “opposing” 
nationalities in eight different situations (stores, parks, sporting events, sport teams, 
concerts, parties, schools/offices and non-governmental organizations). 
2.  Readiness to reconcile with the conflicted nationalities. 
3.  Readiness to accept inter-state cooperation. 
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Traumatic experience and reconciliation process 
 
A  significant  factor  of  reconciliation  process,  usually  neglected  in  existing 
socio-psychological literature, could be the degree of trauma experienced, which 
causes are associated with the members of the out-group. To what extent, if at all, is 
the memory of experienced trauma hindrance to reconciliation process? 
During  Yugoslav  wars,  200,000  people  were  killed,  and  over  two  million 
displaced. The war itself, besides terrifying destruction, had been characterized by 
outrageous suffering of civilians and violation of Geneva Convention, as well as by 
torture in collective camps, which is now the matter before ICTY. 
In the successor states of Yugoslavia, epidemiological data on Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorder (PTSD) are to this day vague or unreliable. It needs to be said, 
though, that studies of PTSD in other war infested areas have been very varied 
(incidences range from 3.5 per cent to 65 per cent of population - Silove, 1999; De 
Jong et al., 2001). 
With  the  exception  of  the  study  of  Pham  et  al.  (2004)  in  Rwanda,  which 
registered correlation between the presence of PTSD symptoms and unpreparedness 
for reconciliation, other studies so far have not looked for connection between PTSD 
and reconciliation. 
Even though the diagnosis of PTSD is relatively clearly defined in psychiatric 
classification systems, the question remains how much is the incidence of PTSD 
objective and exact marker of the degree of trauma experienced by some population. 
According to Transactional Stress Theory of Lazarus and Folkman (1984), intensity 
of  stress  is  only  partly  responsible  for  the  genesis  of  PTSD.  The  perception  of 
trauma by the person experiencing it, as well as his/her coping strategies, is of great 
significance for the appearance of PTSD. Zotović (2002), for example, studied the 
consequences of NATO campaign in Yugoslavia in 1999, and compared presence of 
PTSD  symptoms  in  children  from  two  cities  greatly  differing  in  exposure  to 
bombing. To her and our surprise, she found that the children from Vrbas (where no 
single bomb fell), showed significantly more symptoms than the children from Novi 
Sad (which had been intensively bombed for 78 days). Her conclusion was that the 
inhabitants of Novi Sad (children also) became habituated to the war situation very 
quickly, while the children from Vrbas expected and feared bombs and had various 
irrational notions of that danger, without a chance to experience it, adopt to the 
situation and relieve the anxiety. 
Other  factors  can  also  contribute  to  the  unreliability  of  data  on  PTSD 
incidence. In Croatia, for example, after passing of the law which provided various 
privileges to war participants, including special conditions for disability pension, the 
number of PTSD diagnoses rose suddenly
5.   
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In  an  extensive  study
6  (2000-2002)  in  cities  which  experienced  large  war 
destruction and ethnic cleansing, and where today former war enemies live together 
again (Vukovar in Croatia, with Serbs and Croats, Mostar in B&H, with Croats and 
Bosniaks  and  Prijedor  in  B&H,  with  Serbs  and  Bosniaks),  we  have  studied  the 
relation  of  traumatic  experience  and  attitudes  towards  reconciliation.  The  results 
presented in this paper are the extension of that study. 
 
 
METHOD 
 
 
Sample and procedure 
 
 
The total sample consisted of 800 participants: 400 subjects from Vukovar and 
400 from Prijedor divided equally among national groups in each city. The survey 
sample was randomly selected using a three-stage cluster procedure: the first stage 
unit was the part of the city inhabited predominantly by one of the nationalities, the 
second stage unit were households (using “Random Walk Technique”) and the third 
stage unit were members of the households (whose birthday was closest to the date 
of  the  interview).  The  sample  in  each  cites  was  representative  for  the  town 
population concerning age, gender and education level.  
The  survey  was  conducted  by  trained  interviewers,  using  a  standardized 
interview procedure. The interviewers were of the same nationality as the subjects.  
 
Variables and Instruments 
 
 
The questionnaire consisted of three scales (Ethnic Distance Scale, Stereotype 
Scale and Authoritarian Scale) and questions about attitudes towards nationalism 
and xenophobia, other national groups, reconciliation, the ICTY and war crimes, as 
well as questions about prior experience with members of other national groups, 
traumatic experiences during the war, and demographic data (the list of variables are 
given in Table 1).  
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Table 1: List of variables 
 
VARIABLE  Instruments  Alpha  Mean  S. D.  Range 
 
Readiness for 
Reconciliation 
Set of 3 items 
(Z – score) 
.61  .15  .84  -2.04 – 1.64 
Authoritarianism  Authoritarian 
Scale (13 items) 
.78  8.62  2.86  0 – 13 
Nationalism / Xenophobia  Set of 3 items  .62  1.3  0.98  0 – 3 
Attitude toward the ICTY  One question    2.68  1.42  1 – 5 
Admittance of war crimes 
in one’s own nationality 
One question    .714  .44  0 – 1 
Importance of punishment 
of war crimes for the 
process of reconciliation 
 
One question 
   
.84 
 
.37 
 
0 – 1 
Positive experiences with 
the “opposing” nationality 
before the war 
 
One question 
   
.84 
 
.36 
 
0 – 1 
Having friends among the 
“opposing” nationality 
before the war 
 
One question 
   
.78 
 
.42 
 
0 – 1 
Broken friendships  One question    .50  .50  0 – 1 
Feeling insecure  One question    .26  .41  0 – 1 
Discriminated before the 
war 
Set of 6 items  .79  .50  1.04  0 – 6 
Ethnocentrism (Average 
score for 4 “neutral” 
nations) 
Ethnic Distance 
Scale (5 items) 
.77  2.01  1.17  0 – 5 
Stereotypes (Average score   
for “opposing” 
nationalities) 
Stereotype Scale 
(11 items) 
.94  3.21  .87  1 – 5 
Traumatic war experience  Open question    2.63  .72  1 – 3 
 
Readiness for Reconciliation was composite variable made of sum of Z scores 
of the three mentioned questions.   
Authoritarianism was measured by adopted and shortened version of F scale 
(Adorno et al., 1950), psychometrically developed on the population of the former 
Yugoslavia. 
Ethnocentrism was the average score on Ethnic Distance Scale (readiness to 
accept  different  nationalities,  as:  citizens  of  “my”  state,  neighbors,  friends, 
collaborators  or  close  relatives)  for  “neutral”  nationalities  -  Hungarians, 
Macedonians, Slovenians and Romas. In our previous studies (Biro et al., 2002) the 
score toward “neutral” nations showed high reliability – contrary to the score for 
nationalities in conflict, which is radically changeable. 
The  variable  “Nationalism/Xenophobia”  represents  results  on  the  three 
questions on nationalistic and xenophobic attitudes: 1. “One should be cautious with 
other  nations,  even  when  they  are  our  friends”; 2. “Our  nationality  should  have 
greater rights than other nationalities in our state”; 3. “All our problems would be Mklos Biro and Petar Milin 
 
solved if one nationality lived in one country”. Since those questions have high 
mutual  correlation  and  in  factor  analysis  form  a  unique  factor,  we  created  a 
composite variable out of those three items. 
The  variable  “Discriminated  before  the  war”  contains  experience  of 
discrimination  in  six  different  fields:  court,  police,  employment,  health  service, 
housing or school. 
Traumatic experience was classified into three categories based on our earlier 
experience about correlation of a certain type of trauma and incidence of PTSD. In 
“Extreme  traumatic  experience”  we  included:  loss  of  someone  close,  separation 
from a minor child, having gone through a situation where life was endangered, 
survived  torture,  permanent  loss  of  home/house  and  being  wounded.  “Severe 
traumatic experience” included: seeing someone's death, seeing torture, separation 
from major family members, major financial loss, being close to war actions, the 
unknown  fate  of  close  persons,  capture  (without  torture)  and  longer  period  of 
starvation.  “Mild  traumatic  experience”  included  all  other  traumatic  experiences. 
The distribution of categories is shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Distribution of traumatic experience 
 
Level  of traumatic 
experience 
Serbs- 
Vukovar 
Croats-
Vukovar 
Serbs- 
Prijedor 
Bosniaks-
Prijedor 
Extreme  86%  95%  61%  53.5% 
Severe  5.5%  3%  12.5%  20.5% 
Mild  8.5%  2%  26.5%  26% 
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
Table 3: Multivariate test of significance 
 
Dependent Variable  R  R²  R²Adj.  F  p 
Readiness for Reconciliation  0.690  0.476  0.466  45.666  0.000 
 
Test  for  the  overall  model  (Table  3)  showed  that  statistically  significant 
proportion of the variance of the criterion-variable – Readiness for Reconciliation, is 
explained by the set of predictor-variables. Simply stated, approximately half of the 
variability (48%) in the criterion should be attributed to the variance in the set of 
predictors, while other half is left unexplained. 
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Table 4: Univariate Tests of Significance 
 
Effect  BETA  F  p 
Authoritarianism  0.049  3.269  0.071 
Nationalism / Xenophobia  -0.249  67.008  0.000 
How do you judge the role of the Hague Tribunal for War 
Crimes in the former Yugoslavia? 
-0.055  3.466  0.063 
Are there war criminals among Croats/Serbs/Bosniaks (our 
nationality), according to your opinion?  0.219  49.259  0.000 
For the purpose of cohabitation between Croats and Bosniaks 
and Serbs, is it important to justly punish war criminals from 
both sides? 
-0.053  2.831  0.093 
Have you, as a Croat/Bosniak/Serb, had any positive experience 
with other nation before the war?  0.087  8.162  0.004 
Have you had close friends of other nationality before the war?  0.106  9.140  0.003 
Are your relations with the close friends of other nationality 
disturbed now?  -0.057  4.109  0.043 
Do you feel insecure in Vukovar/Mostar/Prijedor?  -0.059  5.591  0.018 
Discriminated before the war  -0.111  18.885  0.000 
Ethnocentrism  0.096  8.038  0.005 
Average hetero-stereotype  0.127  9.582  0.002 
Traumatic war experience  0.001  0.001  0.975 
 
The significant predictors of the Readiness for Reconciliation are the variables 
(in order of significance): Nationalism/Xenophobia (absence of such an attitudes), 
readiness to admit the existence of war crimes among it’s own nationality, feeling of 
(not) being discriminated by the members of the “opposing” nationality, (positive) 
stereotypes about the “opposing” nationality, having friends among the members of 
the  “opposing”  nationality,  having  positive  experience  with  the  members  of  the 
“opposing nationality, (absence of) Ethnocentrism and feeling of being secure in the 
neighborhood. 
The results also showed drastic differences between attitudes and manifested 
values  in  Serbs  in  Vukovar  and  Bosniaks  in  Prijedor  (they  are  minorities  in 
“foreign” country, i.e. entity) in relation to other groups. Croats from Vukovar and 
Serbs  from  Prijedor  show  extremely  high  authoritarianism,  ethnocentrism  and 
xenophobia  and  low  readiness  for  reconciliation,  while  the  above  mentioned 
minority groups are very positively oriented towards reconciliation and, at the same 
time, very non-nationalistic. Of course, core question is whether these characteristics 
of minority populations are the consequence of the fact that only individuals with 
such value orientations were ready to accept the status of minority nationality, or the 
fact that these subjects feel insecure because they are minority nationality in “enemy 
surroundings”  contributed  that  they  give  socially  desirable  answers  and  present 
themselves as “non-ethnocentric” and “reconciliation ready”. 
Our  next  step  in  analyzing  the  data  was  to  see  what  complex  of  variables 
(factors)  predicts  readiness  for  reconciliation.  For  that  purpose,  we  tested  the Mklos Biro and Petar Milin 
 
General Linear Model, using four extracted factors, as predictors, and the variable 
“Readiness for Reconciliation”, as the criterion (dependent) variable. 
Using Principal Component Analysis with the Varimax - normalized rotation, we 
have extracted four factors that explain 55.86% of total variance. 
A Best-Subset Regression Analysis resulted in a highly significant model. 
Arrows from factors to criteria in Figure 1, represent regression relationships, 
with statistically significant beta coefficients. 
The model suggests that certain attitudes and values represented by the factors 
“Non-Ethnocentric”, “Non-Nationalistic/Xenophobic” and “Non-Authoritarian” are 
the best predictors of Readiness for Reconciliation.  
Also, a belief in war crimes trials, combined with a readiness to admit the 
existence of war crimes among its own nationality is highly related to readiness for 
reconciliation.  Surprisingly,  positive  attitudes  toward  the  ICTY  have  negative 
correlation with this factor!  
The third significant predictor of readiness for reconciliation is the existence of 
friends among the “opposing” nationality, combined with the positive experiences 
with the members of opposing national groups.  
The  factor  combining  feeling  of  being  discriminated  by  the  opposing 
nationality,  actual  feeling  of  insecurity  and  experiences  of  war  trauma  is  also  a 
significant predictor, but against reconciliation. 
As shown in Table 2, all the groups tested have very high traumatization, but 
weighted  sum  of  traumatic  experience  has  relatively  small  (and  statistically 
insignificant) negative correlation with readiness for reconciliation (-.13). Moreover, 
as  the  results  of  the  multivariate  model  show,  traumatic  experience  has  no 
independent  contribution  to  the  prediction  of  readiness  for  reconciliation,  but  in 
combination  with  subjective  experience  of  being  discriminated  by  the  “enemy” 
nationality, this becomes a predictor on the edge of significance (Beta = -.18) in the 
negative direction (i.e. it appears as hindrance to reconciliation).  
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Our  results  are  very  similar  to  the  results  of  the  study  on  the  Holocaust 
survivors (Cherfas, 2003) where the attitudes toward Germans were related to the 
personality characteristics, but not at all with the experienced trauma. 
In this study, the presence of PTSD was not an observation item. Since Pham 
et  al.  (2004)  in  their  study  in  Rwanda  found  correlation  between  PTSD  and 
readiness  for  reconciliation,  and  considering  that  in  our  study  combination  of 
traumatic  experience  and  feeling  of  discrimination  was  also  predictive  of 
(un)readiness for reconciliation, the perception of trauma imposed itself as possible 
common  explanation.  In  other  words,  if  objective  traumatization  does  not  show 
relation to reconciliation, the subjective experience of trauma could be the factor 
connecting  both  incidence  of  PTSD  (which  agrees  with  Lazarus'  and  Folkman's 
theory) and the factor confirming preexisting perception of hostile behavior of the 
out-group. Therefore, our hypothesis is that traumatic experience alone does not 
influence  readiness  for  reconciliation,  but  if  there  already  exists  experience  of 
discrimination or unpleasant experience with particular social group, then the (war) 
trauma will be taken as another proof of hostile behavior of that group and will be a 
hindrance to reconciliation process. 
In accord with the Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Tajfel & 
Forgas, 2000), the process of social categorization contributes to negative evaluation 
of out-group members, and characteristic cognitive process – “ultimate attribution 
error” (Pettigrew, 1979) equalizes all out-group members in their “guilt” and their 
“bad traits”. The logical consequence of such generalization is, of course, resistance 
to any idea of reconciliation. Reasoning behind given facts is: how can we talk about 
reconciliation with a group which is, without exception, “worthless” and “hostile” 
and, which is, even more important, experienced as unchangeable in these traits of 
theirs?  The  stronger  the  social  identity  is,  the  less  will  it  allow  recognition  of 
individual differences; it will not permit the possibility that a part of  "us" can be 
war criminals, nor will it permit the possibility that a part of "them" can be worthy 
of  our  respect  or  sympathy.  In  this  mechanism  we  can  recognize  simple 
psychological explanation why fans of their own nation cannot grasp notorious truth 
that sanctioning one's own war crimes will enable individualization of guilt for these 
crimes, by which removal of collective guilt will be achieved, and, along with that, 
improvement of the image of the whole nation
7. 
It  is  interesting  that  authoritarianism  has  no  independent  contribution  to 
reconciliation  process.  It  is  obvious  that  it  functions  as  an  obstacle  only  when 
associated with (or producing) ethnic prejudices and negative stereotypes, as we 
showed in our previous research (Biro et al., 2004) and as it was shown in several 
experiments (i.e. Duckitt, 1989; Perreault & Bourhis, 1999). 
                                                           
7 The tendency to deny the existence of war crimes committed by the members of its own nation is 
not typical only of the people of the Balkans. After Lieutenant Calley was sentenced for war 
crimes for his actions in the Vietnam village of My Lai, according to a Gallup poll, some 79% of 
American citizens were against that sentence and rejected the idea that there were war crimes 
caused by American soldiers at all (Kelman & Hamilton, 1989)! Traumatic Experience and the Process of Reconciliation 
 
On  the  other  hand,  the  largest  independent  contribution  to  prediction  of 
readiness for reconciliation, have facts that individual had friends among members 
of "enemy" nationality, as well as readiness to admit own-nationality war crimes. 
The fact that pre-war associating with members of the other nation contributes to 
readiness  for  reconciliation  is  consistent  with  the  original  "Contact  Hypothesis" 
(Allport, 1954) and with the later Pettigrew’s (1998) findings that earlier intergroup 
friendships are important facilitator for the later intergroup relationships. Pre-war 
contacts  with  members  of  other  nationality  contribute  to  individualization  of 
perception of nationality, and, thus, contribute to absence of ethnic prejudices and 
stereotypes. 
   
 
CONCLUSION REMARKS 
 
 
  The results of our studies undoubtedly show that traumatic experience is not 
serious hindrance to reconciliation process at individual level. This, certainly, does 
not mean that punishment for war crimes and material destruction, as well as some 
form of symbolic apology of national leaders for the suffering induced to the other 
nation,  are  not  important.  Punishment  of  the  war  criminals  will  have  great 
significance for guilt individualization, while "apology" will influence the change of 
perception  of  opposing  group.  But,  at  individual  level,  the  greatest  obstacle  to 
reconciliation process is value orientations, and not the experienced war trauma. 
Education  for  democracy,  tolerance  for  minorities,  human  rights  (meaning 
absolute equality of members of all social groups) is a long, but the only way of 
change of value systems, which will enable complete readiness for reconciliation, 
and enable members of conflicting nationalities of former Yugoslavia to cooperate 
in joint home -European community. This process must include media, educational 
system, and political elite as well. The role of political authorities gets particular 
significance in the context of outstanding spread of authoritarian characteristics in 
members of all nationalities of ex-Yugoslavia. 
One of the most interesting and the most significant findings of our study is the 
fact that friendly relations with members of other ethnic groups represents one of the 
major  predictors  of  readiness  for  reconciliation.  Even  though  contacts  among 
successor states of Yugoslavia are greatly decreased and made difficult by erecting 
borders among them, the common language of Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks is the 
warranty that there will be much more of these contacts in future. After all, Internet 
communication  shows  this  even  today.  But,  our  results  suggest  that  (media) 
promotion of positive experiences in contacts among members of conflicting nations 
could significantly contribute to the change of picture of the other ethnic group. As 
Hewstone & Brown (1986) suggested, the main limitations of the positive effects of 
inter-group  contacts  are  the  absence of  generalization  and  promotion  of  positive 
attitudes appeared as the result of contact experience. Listing positive examples, 
particularly during war, when very often neighbors of different nationalities helped Mklos Biro and Petar Milin 
 
each other, could be a form of "indirect" positive experience. This would influence 
the decrease  in  prejudices and negative stereotypes  about  other  nationalities  and 
would certainly contribute towards reconciliation process. 
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REZIME 
 
 
TRAUMATSKO ISKUSTVO I PROCES POMIRENJA 
 
 
Mikloš Biro i Petar Milin 
 
 
U uvodnom delu, rad se bavi definicijom pomirenja i razmatra ga sa tri aspekta 
– individualnog, grupnog i državnog, koristeći primere iz procesa pomirenja između 
jugoslovenskih  naroda.  Sledi  prikaz  rezultata  istraživanja  na  400  ispitanika  u 
Vukovaru (200 Srba i 200 Hrvata) i 400 ispitanika u Prijedoru (200 Srba i 200 
Bošnjaka)  usmerenog  da  ispita  stavove prema  pomirenju,  preživljeno traumatsko 
iskustvo, te neke bazične vrednosti, stavove i stereotipe prema narodima sa kojima 
je  postojao  konflikt.  Posmatrano  kao  samostalna  variabla,  stepen  traumatskog 
iskustva  nije imao  značajne  korelacije  sa  spremnošću  za pomirenjem.  Primenom 
Generalnog  linearnog  modela,  kao  najbolji  prediktori  spremnosti  za  pomirenjem 
pokazali  su  se  sledeći  faktori:  faktor  koji  je  okupljao  varijable  (niskog) 
etnocentrizma,  ksenofobije  i  nacionalizma;  faktor  koji  je  ukazivao  na  značaj 
prethodnih  prijateljstava  i  pozitivnih  iskustava  sa  pripadnicima  suprotstavljenog 
naroda;  te  faktor  koji  je  kombinovao  poverenje  u  suđenja  za  ratne  zločine  sa 
spremnošću da se priznaju ratni zločini sopstvene nacije. Sa druge strane, prediktor 
ne-spremnosti za pomirenje bio je faktor koji je kombinovao negativna prethodna 
iskustva sa pripadnicima suprotstavljene nacije i traumatsko ratno iskustvo. 
 
Ključne reči: pomirenje, traumatsko iskustvo, bivša Jugoslavija 
 